WASHINGTON - On May 22, an indictment was presented for confirmation against Slobodan Milosevic and four others charging them with crimes against humanity - specifically murder, deportation and persecutions, and with violations of the laws and customs of war. The indictment was confirmed by a Judge of this Tribunal on May 24.
     The indictment was the subject of a non-disclosure order which expired at noon today. However, the order was issued on the basis of security considerations for the UN humanitarian mission which left the former Yugoslavia today.
     The following accused are jointly indicted: SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; MILAN MILUTINOVIC, President of the Republic of Serbia; NIKOLA SAINOVIC, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.
     Arrests warrants have been issued against all five accused and are being served on all Member States of the United Nations and Switzerland. The warrants are accompanied by a court order requesting all States to search for and freeze any and all assets of the accused under their jurisdiction. This order was sought to prevent foreign assets being used for the purpose of evading justice, and to permit effective restitution to be made upon conviction. These provisional measures are granted without prejudice to the rights of third parties.
     This indictment is based exclusively on crimes committed since the beginning of 1999 in Kosovo. We are continuing todevelop an evidentiary base upon which I believe we will be able to expand upon the present charges. The investigation is continuing.
      Judge David Hunt told reporters, "A prima facie case on any particular charge exists in this situation where the material facts pleaded in the indictment constitute a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient basisn to convict him of that charge."
     He called upon all States to comply with the execution of these, and all outstanding arrests warrants issued by the Tribunal.
     The Indictment follows:

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC

 

INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the Tribunal, charges:

 

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC

 

with
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
and
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR
as set forth below:

 

BACKGROUND

1. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is located in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia, a constituent republic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY). The territory now comprising the FRY was part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY). The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered on the north and north-west by the Republic of Montenegro, another constituent republic of the FRY. On the south-west, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered by the Republic of Albania, and to the south, by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The capital of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is Pristina.

2. In 1990 the Socialist Republic of Serbia promulgated a new Constitution which, among other things, changed the names of the republic and the autonomous provinces. The name of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was changed to the Republic of Serbia (both hereinafter Serbia); the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was changed to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (both hereinafter Kosovo); and the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was changed to the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (hereinafter Vojvodina). During this same period, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro changed its name to the Republic of Montenegro (hereinafter Montenegro).

3. In 1974, a new SFRY Constitution had provided for a devolution of power from the central government to the six constituent republics of the country. Within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given considerable autonomy including control of their educational systems, judiciary, and police. They were also given their own provincial assemblies, and were represented in the Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the Presidency of the SFRY.

4. In 1981, the last census with near universal participation, the total population of Kosovo was approximately 1,585,000 of which 1,227,000 (77%) were Albanians, and 210,000 (13%) were Serbs. Only estimates for the population of Kosovo in 1991 are available because Kosovo Albanians boycotted the census administered that year. General estimates are that the current population of Kosovo is between 1,800,000 and 2,100,000 of which approximately 85-90% are Kosovo Albanians and 5-10% are Serbs.

5. During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern about discrimination against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government while Kosovo Albanians voiced concern about economic underdevelopment and called for greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations which were suppressed by SFRY military and police forces of Serbia.

6. In April 1987, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, who had been elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986, travelled to Kosovo. In meetings with local Serb leaders and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan MILOSEVIC endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. Thereafter, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exploited a growing wave of Serbian nationalism in order to strengthen centralised rule in the SFRY.

7. In September 1987 Slobodan MILOSEVIC and his supporters gained control of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. In 1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was re-elected as Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. From that influential position, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to further develop his political power.

8. From July 1988 to March 1989, a series of demonstrations and rallies supportive of Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s policies -- the so-called "Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution" -- took place in Vojvodina and Montenegro. These protests led to the ouster of the respective provincial and republican governments; the new governments were then supportive of, and indebted to, Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

9. Simultaneously, within Serbia, calls for bringing Kosovo under stronger Serbian rule intensified and numerous demonstrations addressing this issue were held. On 17 November 1988, high-ranking Kosovo Albanian political figures were dismissed from their positions within the provincial leadership and were replaced by appointees loyal to Slobodan MILOSEVIC. In early 1989, the Serbian Assembly proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia which would strip Kosovo of most of its autonomous powers, including control of the police, educational and economic policy, and choice of official language, as well as its veto powers over further changes to the Constitution of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians demonstrated in large numbers against the proposed changes. Beginning in February 1989, a strike by Kosovo Albanian miners further increased tensions.

10. Due to the political unrest, on 3 March 1989, the SFRY Presidency declared that the situation in the province had deteriorated and had become a threat to the constitution, integrity, and sovereignty of the country. The government then imposed "special measures" which assigned responsibility for public security to the federal government instead of the government of Serbia.

11. On 23 March 1989, the Assembly of Kosovo met in Pristina and, with the majority of Kosovo Albanian delegates abstaining, voted to accept the proposed amendments to the constitution. Although lacking the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the President of the Assembly nonetheless declared that the amendments had passed. On 28 March 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974 constitution.

12. At the same time these changes were occurring in Kosovo, Slobodan MILOSEVIC further increased his political power when he became the President of Serbia. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and his post was formally confirmed on 6 December 1989.

13. In early 1990, Kosovo Albanians held mass demonstrations calling for an end to the "special measures." In April 1990, the SFRY Presidency lifted the "special measures" and removed most of the federal police forces as Serbia took over responsibility for police enforcement in Kosovo.

14. In July 1990, the Assembly of Serbia passed a decision to suspend the Assembly of Kosovo shortly after 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates from that Assembly had passed an unofficial resolution declaring Kosovo an equal and independent entity within the SFRY. In September 1990, many of these same Kosovo Albanian delegates proclaimed a constitution for a "Republic of Kosovo." One year later, in September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held an unofficial referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for independence. On 24 May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held unofficial elections for an assembly and president for the "Republic of Kosovo."

15. On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia joined to form the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected its President. As the successor to the League of Communists, the SPS became the dominant political party in Serbia and Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as President of the SPS, was able to wield considerable power and influence over many branches of the government as well as the private sector. Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC have both held prominent positions within the SPS. Nikola SAINOVIC was a member of the Main Committee and the Executive Council as well as a vice-chairman; and Milan MILUTINOVIC successfully ran for President of Serbia in 1997 as the SPS candidate.

16. After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia on 28 September 1990, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of Serbia in multi-party elections held on 9 and 26 December 1990; he was re-elected on 20 December 1992. In December 1991, Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia.

17. After Kosovo’s autonomy was effectively revoked in 1989, the political situation in Kosovo became more and more divisive. Throughout late 1990 and 1991 thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police and civil servants were dismissed from their positions. The local court in Kosovo was abolished and many judges removed. Police violence against Kosovo Albanians increased.

18. During this period, the unofficial Kosovo Albanian leadership pursued a policy of non-violent civil resistance and began establishing a system of unofficial, parallel institutions in the health care and education sectors.

19. In late June 1991 the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter Slovenia), the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter Croatia), and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia and Herzegovina). On 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of war; a peace agreement was reached on 8 July 1991. Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, leading to fighting between Croatian military forces on the one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), paramilitary units and the "Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina" on the other.

20. On 6 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence, resulting in wide scale war after 6 April 1992. On 27 April 1992, the SFRY was reconstituted as the FRY. At this time, the JNA was re-formed as the Armed Forces of the FRY (hereinafter VJ). In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA, and later the VJ, fought along with the "Army of Republika Srpska" against military forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Croat Defence Council." Active hostilities ceased with the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995.

21. Although Slobodan MILOSEVIC was the President of Serbia during the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was nonetheless the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de facto control of the federal government as well as the republican government and was the person with whom the international community negotiated a variety of peace plans and agreements related to these wars.

22. Between 1991 and 1997 Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC both held a number of high ranking positions within the federal and republican governments and continued to work closely with Slobodan MILOSEVIC. During this period, Milan MILUTINOVIC worked in the Foreign Ministry of the FRY, and at one time was Ambassador to Greece; in 1995, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY, a position he held until 1997. Nikola SAINOVIC was Prime Minister of Serbia in 1993 and Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY in 1994.

23. While the wars were being conducted in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo, while tense, did not erupt into the violence and intense fighting seen in the other countries. In the mid-1990s, however, a faction of the Kosovo Albanians organised a group known as Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or, known in English as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This group advocated a campaign of armed insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities. In mid-1996, the KLA began launching attacks primarily targeting FRY and Serbian police forces. Thereafter, and throughout 1997, FRY and Serbian police forces responded with forceful operations against suspected KLA bases and supporters in Kosovo.

24. After concluding his term as President of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY 15 July 1997, and assumed office on 23 July 1997. Thereafter, elections for the office of the President of Serbia were held; Milan MILUTINOVIC ran as the SPS candidate and was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997. In 1996, 1997 and 1998, Nikola SAINOVIC was re-appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY. In part through his close alliance with Milan MILUTINOVIC, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to retain his influence over the Government of Serbia.

25. Beginning in late February 1998, the conflict intensified between the KLA on the one hand and the VJ, the police forces of the FRY, police forces of Serbia, and paramilitary units (all hereinafter forces of the FRY and Serbia), on the other hand. A number of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were killed and wounded during this time. Forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a campaign of shelling predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns and villages, widespread destruction of property, and expulsions of the civilian population from areas in which the KLA was active. Many residents fled the territory as a result of the fighting and destruction or were forced to move to other areas within Kosovo. The United Nations estimates that by mid-October 1998, over 298,000 persons, roughly fifteen percent of the population, had been internally displaced within Kosovo or had left the province.

26. In response to the intensifying conflict, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 "condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo," and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six months later the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 (1998) which stated that "the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region." The Security Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that "the security forces used for civilian repression" be withdrawn.

27. In an attempt to diffuse tensions in Kosovo, negotiations between Slobodan MILOSEVIC, and representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were conducted in October 1998. An "Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission" was signed on 16 October 1998. This agreement and the "Clark-Naumann agreement," which was signed by Nikola SAINOVIC, provided for the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from Kosovo, a limitation on the introduction of additional forces and equipment into the area, and the deployment of unarmed OSCE verifiers.

28. Although scores of OSCE verifiers were deployed throughout Kosovo, hostilities continued. During this period, a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians were documented by the international verifiers and human rights organisations. In one such incident, on 15 January 1999, 45 unarmed Kosovo Albanians were murdered in the village of Racak in the municipality of Stimlje/Shtime.

29. In a further response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo, an international peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France beginning on 7 February 1999. Nikola SAINOVIC, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, was a member of the Serbian delegation at the peace talks and Milan MILUTINOVIC, President of Serbia, was also present during the negotiations. The Kosovo Albanians were represented by the KLA and a delegation of Kosovo Albanian political and civic leaders. Despite intensive negotiations over several weeks, the peace talks collapsed in mid-March 1999.

30. During the peace negotiations in France, the violence in Kosovo continued. In late February and early March, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo Albanian villages and towns. The FRY military forces were comprised of elements of the 3rd Army, specifically the 52nd Corps, also known as the Pristina Corps, and several brigades and regiments under the command of the Pristina Corps. The Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, with command responsibilities over the 3rd Army and ultimately over the Pristina Corps, is Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC. The Supreme Commander of the VJ is Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

31. The police forces taking part in the actions in Kosovo are members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia in addition to some units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FRY. All police forces employed by or working under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia are commanded by Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. Under the FRY Act on the Armed Forces, those police forces engaged in military operations during a state of war or imminent threat of war are subordinated to the command of the VJ whose commanders are Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC and Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

32. Prior to December 1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC designated Nikola SAINOVIC as his representative for the Kosovo situation. A number of diplomats and other international officials who needed to speak with a government official regarding events in Kosovo were directed to Nikola SAINOVIC. He took an active role in the negotiations establishing the OSCE verification mission for Kosovo and he participated in numerous other meetings regarding the Kosovo crisis. From January 1999 to the date of this indictment, Nikola SAINCOVIC has acted as the liaison between Slobodan MILOSEVIC and various Kosovo Albanian leaders.

33. Nikola SAINOVIC was most recently re-appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY on 20 May 1998. As such, he is a member of the Government of the FRY, which, among other duties and responsibilities, formulates domestic and foreign policy, enforces federal law, directs and co-ordinates the work of federal ministries, and organises defence preparations.

34. During their offensives, forces of the FRY and Serbia acting in concert have engaged in a well-planned and co-ordinated campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. Towns and villages have been shelled, homes, farms, and businesses burned, and personal property destroyed. As a result of these orchestrated actions, towns, villages, and entire regions have been made uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians. Additionally, forces of the FRY and Serbia have harassed, humiliated, and degraded Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal abuse. The Kosovo Albanians have also been persistently subjected to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts based on ethnicity and religion, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment.

35. The unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes in Kosovo involved well-planned and co-ordinated efforts by the leaders of the FRY and Serbia, and forces of the FRY and Serbia, all acting in concert. Actions similar in nature took place during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995. During those wars, Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces forcibly expelled and deported non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from areas under Serbian control utilising the same method of operations as have been used in Kosovo in 1999: heavy shelling and armed attacks on villages; widespread killings; destruction of non-Serbian residential areas and cultural and religious sites; and forced transfer and deportation of non-Serbian populations.

36. On 24 March 1999, NATO began launching air strikes against targets in the FRY. The FRY issued decrees of an imminent threat of war on 23 March 1999 and a state of war on 24 March 1999. Since the air strikes commenced, forces of the FRY and Serbia have intensified their systematic campaign and have forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians.

37. In addition to the forced expulsions of Kosovo Albanians, forces of the FRY and Serbia have also engaged in a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians since 24 March 1999. Such killings occurred at numerous locations, including but not limited to, Bela Crkva, Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel -- Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde, Dakovica/Gjakovë , Crkovez/Padalishte, and Izbica.

38. The planning, preparation and execution of the campaign undertaken by forces of the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo, was planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Slobodan MILOSEVIC, the President of the FRY; Milan MILUTINOVIC, the President of Serbia; Nikola SAINOVIC, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY; Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC, the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ; and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

39. By 20 May 1999, over 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, approximately one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, were expelled from Kosovo. Thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovo Albanians have been killed in the operations by forces of the FRY and Serbia.

 

THE ACCUSED

40. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was born on 20 August 1941 in the town of Pozarevac in present-day Serbia. In 1964 he received a law degree from the University of Belgrade and began a career in management and banking. Slobodan MILOSEVIC held the posts of deputy director and later general director at Tehnogas, a major gas company until 1978. Thereafter, he became president of Beogradska banka (Beobanka), one of the largest banks in the SFRY and held that post until 1983.

41. In 1983 Slobodan MILOSEVIC began his political career. He became Chairman of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade in 1984. In 1986 he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and was re-elected in 1988. On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia were united; the new party was named the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected its President. He holds the post of President of the SPS as of the date of this indictment.

42. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and re-elected on 5 December that same year. After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia on 28 September 1990, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected to the newly established office of President of Serbia in multi-party elections held on 9 and 26 December 1990; he was re-elected on 20 December 1992.

43. After serving two terms as President of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997 and he began his official duties on 23 July 1997. At all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has held the post of President of the FRY.

44. Milan MILUTINOVIC was born on 19 December 1942 in Belgrade in present-day Serbia. Milan MILUTINOVIC received a degree in law from Belgrade University.

45. Throughout his political career, Milan MILUTINOVIC has held numerous high level governmental posts within Serbia and the FRY. Milan MILUTINOVIC was a deputy in the Socio-Political Chamber and a member of the foreign policy committee in the Federal Assembly; he was Serbia’s Secretary for Education and Sciences, a member of the Executive Council of the Serbian Assembly, and a director of the Serbian National Library. Milan MILUTINOVIC also served as an ambassador in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the FRY Ambassador to Greece. He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY on 15 August 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC is a member of the SPS.

46. On 21 December 1997, Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected President of Serbia. At all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC has held the post of President of Serbia.

47. Nikola SAINOVIC was born on 7 December 1948 in Bor, Serbia. He graduated from the University of Ljubljana in 1977 and holds a Master of Science degree in Chemical Engineering. He began his political career in the municipality of Bor where he held the position of President of the Municipal Assembly of Bor from 1978 to 1982.

48. Throughout his political career, Nikola SAINOVIC has been an active member of both the League of Communists and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). He held the position of Chairman of the Municipal Committee of the League of Communists in Bor. On 28 November 1995, Nikola SAINOVIC was elected a member of the SPS’s Main Committee and a member of its Executive Council. He was also named president of the Committee to prepare the SPS Third Regular Congress (held in Belgrade on 2-3 March 1996). On 2 March 1996 Nikola SAINOVIC was elected one of several vice chairmen of the SPS. He held this position until 24 April 1997.

49. Nikola SAINOVIC has held several positions within the governments of Serbia and the FRY. In 1989, he served as a member of the Executive Council of Serbia’s Assembly and Secretary for Industry, Energetics and Engineering of Serbia in 1989. He was appointed Minister of Mining and Energy of Serbia on 11 February 1991, and again on 23 December 1991. On 23 December 1991, he was also named Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed Minister of the Economy of the FRY on 14 July 1992, and again on 11 September 1992. He resigned from this post on 29 November 1992. On 10 February 1993, Nikola SAINOVIC was elected Prime Minister of Serbia.

50. On 22 February 1994, Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY. He was re-appointed to this position in three subsequent governments: on 12 June 1996, 20 March 1997 and 20 May 1998. Slobodan MILOSEVIC designated Nikola SAINOVIC as his representative for the Kosovo situation. Nikola SAINOVIC chaired the commission for co-operation with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, and was an official member of the Serbian delegation at the Rambouillet peace talks in February 1999. At all times relevant to this indictment, Nikola SAINOVIC has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY.

51. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was born on 1 June 1941 in the village of Ravni, near Uzice in what is now Serbia. In 1958, he completed the Infantry School for Non-Commissioned Officers and in 1964, he completed the Military Academy of the Ground Forces. In 1985, Dragoljub OJDANIC graduated from the Command Staff Academy and School of National Defence with a Masters Degree in Military Sciences. At one time he served as the Secretary for the League of Communists for the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 52nd Corps, the precursor of the 52nd Corps of the VJ now operating in Kosovo.

52. In 1992, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was the Deputy Commander of the 37th Corps of the JNA, later the VJ, based in Uzice, Serbia. He was promoted to Major General on 20 April 1992 and became Commander of the Uzice Corps. Under his command, the Uzice Corps was involved in military actions in eastern Bosnia during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993 and 1994 Dragoljub OJDANIC served as Chief of the General Staff of the First Army of the FRY. He was Commander of the First Army between 1994 and 1996. In 1996, he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VJ. On 26 November 1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC appointed Dragoljub OJDANIC Chief of General Staff of the VJ, replacing General Momcilo Perisic. At all times relevant to this indictment, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC has held the post of Chief of the General Staff of the VJ.

53. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was born in Mala Krsna, in Serbia. He graduated from the University of Belgrade with a law degree, and then was employed at the municipal court. Thereafter, he became head of the Inter-Municipal Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Pozarevac. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC has served as director of the PIK firm in Pozarevac, vice-president and president of the Economic Council of Yugoslavia, and president of the Economic Council of Serbia.

54. By April 1997, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC became Deputy Prime Minister of the Serbian Government and Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. On 24 March 1998, the Serbian Assembly elected a new Government, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was named Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. He is also a member of the main board of the SPS. At all times relevant to this indictment, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, has held the post of Minister of Internal Affairs.

 

SUPERIOR AUTHORITY

55. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997, assumed office on 23 July 1997, and remains President as of the date of this indictment.

56. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC functions as President of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY. The Supreme Defence Council consists of the President of the FRY and the Presidents of the member republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The Supreme Defence Council decides on the National Defence Plan and issues decisions concerning the VJ. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has the power to "order implementation of the National Defence Plan" and commands the VJ in war and peace in compliance with decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council. Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, performs these duties through "commands, orders and decisions."

57. Under the FRY Act on the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises command authority over republican and federal police units subordinated to the VJ during a state of imminent threat of war or a state of war. A declaration of imminent threat of war was proclaimed on 23 March 1999, and a state of war on 24 March 1999.

58. In addition to his de jure powers, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de facto control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the offences alleged herein. Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de facto control over federal institutions nominally under the competence of the Assembly or the Government of the FRY. Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises de facto control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including the Serbian police force. Slobodan MILOSEVIC further exercises de facto control over numerous aspects of the FRY’s political and economic life, particularly the media. Between 1986 and the early 1990s, Slobodan MILOSEVIC progressively acquired de facto control over these federal, republican, provincial and other institutions. He continues to exercise this de facto control to this day.

59. Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s de facto control over Serbian, SFRY, FRY and other state organs has stemmed, in part, from his leadership of the two principal political parties that have ruled in Serbia since 1986, and in the FRY since 1992. From 1986 until 1990, he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Serbia, then the ruling party in Serbia. In 1990, he was elected President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor party to the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. The SPS has been the principal ruling party in Serbia and the FRY ever since. Throughout the period of his Presidency of Serbia, from 1990 to 1997, and as the President of the FRY, from 1997 to the present, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has also been the leader of the SPS.

60. Beginning no later than October 1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of Serbia, including its police force. Beginning no later than October 1988, he has exercised de facto control over Serbia’s two autonomous provinces -- Kosovo and Vojvodina -- and their representation in federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY. From no later than October 1988 until mid-1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of the Montenegro, including its representation in all federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY.

61. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the primary interlocutor with whom the international community has negotiated. He has negotiated international agreements that have subsequently been implemented within Serbia, the SFRY, the FRY, and elsewhere on the territory of the former SFRY. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the primary representative of the SFRY and FRY are: The Hague Conference in 1991; the Paris negotiations of March 1993; the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in January 1993; the Vance-Owen peace plan negotiations between January and May 1993; the Geneva peace talks in the summer of 1993; the Contact Group meeting in June 1994; the negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995.

62. As the President of the FRY, the Supreme Commander of the VJ, and the President of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Slobodan MILOSEVIC is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the VJ and any police forces, both federal and republican, who have committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 in the province of Kosovo.

63. Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997, and remains President as of the date of this indictment. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC is the head of State. He represents Serbia and conducts its relations with foreign states and international organisations. He organises preparations for the defence of Serbia.

64. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC is a member of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY and participates in decisions regarding the use of the VJ.

65. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC, in conjunction with the Assembly, has the authority to request reports both from the Government of Serbia, concerning matters under its jurisdiction, and from the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, concerning its activities and the security situation in Serbia. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC has the authority to dissolve the Assembly, and with it the Government, "subject to the proposal of the Government on justified grounds," although this power obtains only in peacetime.

66. During a declared state of war or state of imminent threat of war, Milan MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia, may enact measures normally under the competence of the Assembly, including the passage of laws; these measures may include the reorganisation of the Government and its ministries, as well as the restriction of certain rights and freedoms.

67. In addition to his de jure powers, Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises extensive de facto influence or control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the crimes alleged herein. Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises de facto influence or control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of the Government and Assembly of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including but not limited to the Serbian police force.

68. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1995, Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a principal interlocutor with whom the international community has negotiated. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a primary representative of the FRY are: preliminary negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15-21 August 1995; the Geneva meetings regarding the Bosnian cease fire, 7 September 1995; further negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; the meeting of Balkan foreign ministers in New York, 26 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC was also present at the negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999.

69. As the President of Serbia, and a member of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Milan MILUTINOVIC is responsible for the actions of any of his subordinates within the VJ and within any police forces who have committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

70. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the VJ on 26 November 1998. He remains in that position as of the date of this indictment. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC commands, orders, instructs, regulates and otherwise directs the VJ, pursuant to acts issued by the President of the FRY and as required to command the VJ.

71. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC determines the organisation, plan of development and formation of commands, units and institutions of the VJ, in conformity with the nature and needs of the VJ and pursuant to acts rendered by the President of the FRY.

72. In his position of authority, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC also determines the plan for recruiting and filling vacancies within the VJ and the distribution of recruits therein; issues regulations concerning training of the VJ; determines the educational plan and advanced training of professional and reserve military officers; and performs other tasks stipulated by law.

73. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC -- or other officers empowered by him -- assigns commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and promotes non-commissioned officers, reserve officers, and officers up to the rank of colonel. In addition, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC nominates the president, judges, prosecutors, and their respective deputies and secretaries, to serve on military disciplinary courts.

74. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC carries out preparations for the conscription of citizens and mobilisation of the VJ; co-operates with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY and Serbia and the Ministry of Defence of the FRY in mobilising organs and units of Ministries of Internal Affairs; monitors and, proposes measures to correct problems encountered during, and informs the Government of the FRY and the Supreme Defence Council about the implementation of the aforementioned mobilisation.

75. As the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ , Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the VJ and for the actions of any federal and republican police forces, which are subordinated to the VJ, who have committed crimes since January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

76. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was named Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia on 24 March 1998. As head of a Serbian government ministry, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC is responsible for the enforcement of laws, regulations and general acts promulgated by Serbia’s Assembly, Government or President.

77. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC directs the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its personnel. He determines the structure, mandate and scope of operations of organisational units within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He is empowered to call up members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reserve corps to perform duties during peace time, and to prevent activities threatening Serbia’s security. The orders which he and Ministry of Internal Affairs superior officers issue to Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel are binding unless they constitute a criminal act.

78. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC has powers of review over decisions and acts of agents for the Ministry. He considers appeals against decisions made in the first instance by the head of an organisational unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, he is empowered to decide appeals made by individuals who have been detained by the police.

79. On 8 April 1999, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC’s powers during the state of war were expanded to include transferring Ministry employees to different duties within the Ministry for as long as required.

80. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of law and order in Serbia. As Minister of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the police forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia who have committed crimes since January 1999 in the province of Kosovo.

 

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

81. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed conflict existed in Kosovo in the FRY.

82. All acts and omissions charged as crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population of Kosovo in the FRY.

83. Each of the accused is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual criminal responsibility includes committing, planning, instigating, ordering or aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal Statute.

84. In as much as he has authority or control over the VJ and police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as President of the FRY, Supreme Commander of the VJ and President of the Supreme Defence Council, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including members of the VJ and aforementioned employees of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY and Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

85. In as much as he has authority or control over police units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the VJ, or police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Milan MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia and a member of the Supreme Defence Council, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including aforementioned employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

86. In as much as he has authority or control over the VJ and police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC, as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including members of the VJ and aforementioned employees of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of Serbia and the FRY, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

87. In as much as he has authority or control over employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including any other regular or mobilised police units, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

88. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) was/were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

89. The general allegations contained in paragraphs 81 through 88 are re-alleged and incorporated into each of the charges set forth below.

 

CHARGES

COUNTS 1 - 4
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR

90. Beginning in January 1999 and continuing to the date of this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo in the FRY.

91. The campaign of terror and violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population was executed by forces of the FRY and Serbia acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC. The operations targeting the Kosovo Albanians were undertaken with the objective of removing a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province. To achieve this objective, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting in concert, have engaged in well-planned and co-ordinated operations as described in paragraphs 92 through 98 below.

92. The forces of the FRY and Serbia, have in a systematic manner, forcibly expelled and internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes across the entire province of Kosovo. To facilitate these expulsions and displacements, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have intentionally created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through the use of force, threats of force, and acts of violence.

93. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have looted and pillaged the personal and commercial property belonging to Kosovo Albanians forced from their homes. Policemen, soldiers, and military officers have used wholesale searches, threats of force, and acts of violence to rob Kosovo Albanians of money and valuables, and in a systematic manner, authorities at FRY border posts have stolen personal vehicles and other property from Kosovo Albanians being deported from the province.

94. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have engaged in a systematic campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. This has been accomplished through the widespread shelling of towns and villages; the burning of homes, farms, and businesses; and the destruction of personal property. As a result of these orchestrated actions, villages, towns, and entire regions have been made uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians.

95. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have harassed, humiliated, and degraded Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal abuse. Policemen, soldiers, and military officers have persistently subjected Kosovo Albanians to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment based on their racial, religious, and political identification.

96. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have systematically seized and destroyed the personal identity documents and licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians. As Kosovo Albanians have been forced from their homes and directed towards Kosovo’s borders, they have been subjected to demands to surrender identity documents at selected points en route to border crossings and at border crossings into Albania and Macedonia. These actions have been undertaken in order to erase any record of the deported Kosovo Albanians’ presence in Kosovo and to deny them the right to return to their homes.

97. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC have perpetrated the actions set forth in paragraphs 92 through 96, which have resulted in the forced deportation of approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians. These actions have been undertaken in all areas of Kosovo, and these means and methods were used throughout the province, including the following municipalities:

a. Dakovica/Gjakovë : On or about 2 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began forcing residents of the town of Dakovica/Gjakovë to leave. Forces of the FRY and Serbia spread out through the town and went house to house ordering Kosovo Albanians from their homes. In some instances, people were killed, and most persons were threatened with death. Many of the houses and shops belonging to Kosovo Albanians were set on fire, while those belonging to Serbs were protected. During the period from 2 to 4 April 1999, thousands of Kosovo Albanians living in Dakovica/Gjakovë and neighbouring villages joined a large convoy, either on foot or driving in cars, trucks and tractors, and moved to the border with Albania. Forces of the FRY and Serbia directed those fleeing along pre-arranged routes, and at police checkpoints along the way most Kosovo Albanians had their identification papers and license plates seized. In some instances, Yugoslav army trucks were used to transport persons to the border with Albania.

b. Gnjilane/Gjilan: Forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the town of Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë on or about 6 April 1999, and ordered residents to leave saying that the town would be mined the next day. The townspeople left and tried to go to another village but were turned back by police. On 13 April 1999, residents of Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë were again informed that the town had to be evacuated by the following day. The next morning, the Kosovo Albanian residents left in a convoy of approximately 500 vehicles and headed to the Macedonian border. Shortly after the residents left, the houses in Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë were set on fire. Kosovo Albanians in other villages in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality were also forced from their homes, and were made to join another convoy to the Macedonian border. Along the way, some men were taken from the convoy and killed along the road. When the Kosovo Albanians reached the border, their identification papers were confiscated.

c. Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë : In late March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began moving systematically through the town of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë . They entered the homes of Kosovo Albanians and ordered the residents to leave their houses at once and to go to the bus station. Some houses were set on fire forcing the residents to flee to other parts of the town. Over a two week period the forces of the FRY and Serbia continued to expel the Kosovo Albanian residents of the town. During this period, properties belonging to Kosovo Albanians were destroyed and Kosovo Albanians were robbed of money, vehicles, and other valuables. A similar pattern was repeated in other villages in the Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë municipality, where Kosovo Albanians were forced from their homes, followed by the destruction of their villages by forces of the FRY and Serbia. The Kosovo Albanian residents of the municipality were forced to join convoys going to the Albanian border. En route to the border, Serb soldiers, policemen, and military officers robbed them of valuables and seized their identity documents.

d. Orahovac/Rahovec: On the morning of 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the village of Celine with tanks and armoured vehicles. After shelling the village, troops entered the village and systematically looted and pillaged everything of value from the houses. Most of the Kosovo Albanian villagers had fled to a nearby forest before the army and police arrived. On 28 March, a number of Serb police forced the thousands of people hiding in the forest to come out. After marching the civilians to a nearby village, the men were separated from the women and were beaten, robbed, and had all of their identity documents taken from them. The men were then marched to Prizren and eventually forced to go to the Albanian border.

On 25 March 1999, a large group of Kosovo Albanians went to a mountain near the village of Nagafc, also in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality, seeking safety from attacks on nearby villages. Forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded them and on the following day, ordered the 8,000 people who had sought shelter on the mountain to leave. The Kosovo Albanians were forced to go to a nearby school and then they were forcibly dispersed into nearby villages. After three or four days, the forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the villages, went house to house and ordered people out. Eventually, they were forced back into houses and told not to leave. Those who could not fit inside the houses were forced to stay in cars and tractors parked nearby. On 2 April 1999, the forces of the FRY and Serbia started shelling the villages, killing a number of people who had been sleeping in tractors and cars. Those who survived headed for the Albanian border. As they passed through other Kosovo Albanian villages, which had been destroyed, they were taunted by Serb soldiers. When the villagers arrived at the border, all their identification papers were taken from them.

e. Pec/Pejë : On 27 and 28 March 1999, in the city of Pec/Pejë , forces of the FRY and Serbia went from house to house forcing Kosovo Albanians to leave. Some houses were set on fire and a number of people were shot. Soldiers and police were stationed along every street directing the Kosovo Albanians toward the town centre. Once the people reached the centre of town, those without cars or vehicles were forced to get on buses or trucks and were driven to the town of Prizren. Outside Prizren, the Kosovo Albanians were forced to get off the buses and walk approximately 40 kilometres to the Albanian border where they were ordered to turn their identification papers over to Serb policemen.

f. Pristina/Prishtinë : On or about 1 April 1999, Serbian police went to the homes of Kosovo Albanians in the city of Pristina/Prishtinë and forced the residents to leave in a matter of minutes. During the course of these forced expulsions, a number of people were killed. Many of those forced from their homes went directly to the train station, while others sought shelter in nearby neighbourhoods. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians, guided by Serb police at all the intersections, gathered at the train station and then were loaded onto overcrowded trains or buses after a long wait where no food or water was provided. Those on the trains went as far as General Jankovic, a village near the Macedonian border. During the train ride many people had their identification papers taken from them. After getting off the trains, the Kosovo Albanians were told by the Serb police to walk along the tracks into Macedonia since the surrounding land had been mined. Those who tried to hide in Pristina/Prishtinë were expelled a few days later in a similar fashion.

During the same period, forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the villages of Pristina/Prishtinë municipality where they beat and killed many Kosovo Albanians, robbed them of their money, looted their property and burned their homes. Many of the villagers were taken by truck to Glogovac in the municipality of Lipljan/Lipjan. From there, they were transported to General Jankovic by train and walked to the Macedonian border. Others, after making their way to the town of Urosevac/Ferizaj, were ordered by the Serb police to take a train to General Jankovic, from where they walked across the border into Macedonia.

g. Prizren: On 25 March 1999 the village of Pirana was surrounded by forces of the FRY and Serbia, tanks and various military vehicles. The village was shelled and a number of the residents were killed. Thereafter, police entered the village and burned the house of Kosovo Albanians. After the attack, the remaining villagers left Pirana and went to surrounding villages. Some of the Kosovo Albanians fleeing toward Srbica were killed or wounded by snipers. Serb forces then launched an offensive in the area of Srbica and shelled the villages of Reti e Utlet, Reti and Randobrava. Kosovo Albanian villagers were forced from their homes and sent to the Albanian border. From 28 March 1999, in the city of Prizren itself, Serb policemen went from house to house, ordering Kosovo Albanian residents to leave. They were forced to join convoys of vehicles and persons travelling on foot to the Albanian border. At the border all personal documents were taken away by Serb policemen.

h. Srbica/Skenderaj: On or about 25 March 1999, the villages of Vojnik, Lecina, Klladernica, Turiqevc Broje and Izbica were destroyed by shelling and burning. A group of approximately 4,500 Kosovo Albanians from these villages gathered outside the village of Izbica where members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia demanded money from the group and separated the men from the women and children. A large number of the men were then killed. The surviving women and children were moved as a group towards Vojnik and then on to the Albanian border.

i. Suva Reka/Suharekë : On the morning of 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the town of Suva Reka/Suharekë . During the following days, police officers went from house to house, threatening Kosovo Albanian residents, and removing many of the people from their homes at gunpoint. The women, children and elderly were sent away by the police and then a number of the men were killed by the Forces of the FRY and Serbia. The Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee making their way in trucks, tractors and trailers towards the border with Albania. While crossing the border, they had all their documents and money taken.

On 31 March 1999, approximately 80,000 Kosovo Albanians displaced from villages in the Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality gathered near Bellanice. The following day, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled Bellanice, forcing the displaced persons to flee toward the Albanian border. Prior to crossing the border, they had all their identification documents taken away.

j. Urosevac/Ferizaj: During the period between 4 and 14 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled the villages of Softaj, Rahovica, Zltara, Pojatista, Komoglava and Sojevo, killing a number of residents. After the shelling, police and military vehicles entered the villages and ordered the residents to leave. After the villagers left their houses, the soldiers and policemen burned the houses. The villagers that were displaced joined in a convoy to the Macedonian border. At the border, all of their documents were taken.

98. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, have murdered hundreds of Kosovo Albanian civilians. These killings have occurred in a widespread or systematic manner throughout the province of Kosovo and have resulted in the deaths of numerous men, women, and children. Included among the incidents of mass killings are the following:

a. On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Racak (Stimlje/Shtime municipality) was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. After shelling by the VJ units, the Serb police entered the village later in the morning and began conducting house-to-house searches. Villagers, who attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village. A group of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by the Serb police. They were beaten and then were removed to a nearby hill, where the policemen shot and killed them. Altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Racak. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule A, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

b. On or about 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Bela Crkva (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality). Many of the residents of Bela Crkva fled into a streambed outside the village and sought shelter under a railroad bridge. As additional villagers approached the bridge, a Serbian police patrol opened fire on them killing 12 persons, including 10 women and children. The police then ordered the remaining villagers out of the streambed, at which time the men were separated from the women and small children. The police ordered the men to strip and then systematically robbed them of all valuables. The women and children were then ordered to leave. The village doctor attempted to speak with the police commander, but he was shot and killed, as was his nephew. The other men were then ordered back into the streambed. After they complied, the police opened fire on the men, killing approximately 65 Kosovo Albanians. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule B which is attached as an appendix to the indictment.)

c. On or about 25 March 1999, the villages of Velika Krusa and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Mahde and Krushe e Vogel (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality) were attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Village residents took refuge in a forested area outside Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde, where they were able to observe the police systematically looting and then burning the villagers’ houses. On or about the morning of 26 March 1999, Serb police located the villagers in the forest. The police ordered the women and small children to leave the area and to go to Albania. The police then searched the men and boys and took their identity documents, after which they were made to walk to an uninhabited house between the forest and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel. Once the men and boys were assembled inside the house, the Serb police opened fire on the group. After several minutes of gunfire, the police piled hay on the men and boys and set fire to it in order to burn the bodies. As a result of the shootings and the fire, approximately 105 Kosovo Albanian men and boys were killed by the Serb police. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule C which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

d. On or about the evening of 26 March 1999, in the town of Dakovica/Gjakovë , Serb gunmen came to a house on Ymer Grezda Street. The women and children inside the house were separated from the men, and were ordered to go upstairs. The Serb gunmen then shot and killed the 6 Kosovo Albanian men who were in the house. (The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule D which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

e. On or about 27 March 1999, in the morning hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Crkolez/Padalishte (Istok/Istog municipality). As the forces entered the village, they fired on houses and on villagers who attempted to flee. Eight members of the Beke IMERAJ family were forced from their home and were killed in front of their house. Other residents of Crkolez/Padalishte were killed at their homes and in a streambed near the village. Altogether, forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 20 Kosovo Albanians from Crkolez/Padalishte. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule E which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

f. On or about 27 March 1999, FRY and Republic of Serbia forces attacked the village of Izbica (Srbica/Skenderaj municipality). Several thousand village residents took refuge in a meadow outside the village. On or about 28 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the villagers and then approached them, demanding money. After valuables were stolen by the soldiers and policemen, the men were separated from the women and small children. The men were then further divided into two groups, one of which was sent to a nearby hill, and the other of which was sent to a nearby streambed. Both groups of men were then fired upon by the forces of the FRY and Serbia, and approximately 130 Kosovo Albanian men were killed. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule F which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

g. On or about the early morning hours of 2 April 1999, Serb police launched an operation against the Qerim district of Dakovica/Gjakovë . Over a period of several hours, Serb police forcibly entered houses of Kosovo Albanians in the Qerim district, killing the occupants, and then setting fire to the buildings. In the basement of a house on Millosh Gilic Street, the Serb police shot the 20 occupants and then set the house on fire. As a result of the shootings and the fires set by the Serb police, 20 Kosovo Albanians were killed, of whom 19 were women and children. (The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule G which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

99. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, have utilised the means and methods set forth in paragraphs 92 through 98 to execute a campaign of persecution against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population based on political, racial, or religious grounds.

100. By these actions Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of:

 

COUNT 1
(Deportation)

Count 1: Deportation, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Article 5(d) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

 

COUNT 2
(Murder)

Count 2: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Article 5 (a) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

 

COUNT 3
(Murder)

Count 3: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) (murder) of the Geneva Conventions.

 

COUNT 4
(Persecutions)

Count 4: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Louise Arbour
Prosecutor

22 May 1999
The Hague, The Netherlands

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Tuesday, May 24, 1999

President's War Making Power Limited
House has not authorized Clinton to conduct military air operations
and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
By Howard Hobbs, Editor & Publisher

     WASHINGTON - On March 24, 1999, President Clinton announced that U.S. Armed Forces, along with military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations had begun air strikes against Serbian military targets in the former Yugoslavia. On March 26, the President submitted a report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate stating that "...on March 24 U.S. military forces...began a series of air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." President Clinton asserted that he ordered United States forces into action "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.
     Since March 24, NATO has engaged in daily air operations against Serb targets in Kosovo and Serbia. There has been a steady buildup of military capacity. As of May 6, 1999, 800 U.S. airplanes have been committed to Operation Allied Force. As of May 14, there have been a total of 20,772 air sorties, of which 7,135 were strike sorties, and over 9,000 munitions have been launched at over 1,900 targets. At the end of the current on-going buildup of air power for Operation Allied Force, the NATO Air Armada will total 1,259, of which 982, or almost 80%, will be U.S. aircraft. General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has termed the military operation over Kosovo to be "a major war theatre, as far as the air war is concerned."
     Within a week of the commencement of NATO air strikes against Yugoslav military targets, Serbian forces stepped up their activities against residents of Kosovo, setting off the flight of over one million Kosovars displaced from their homes and villages, many seeking safety and refuge in neighboring states of Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. In response, President Clinton told congressional leaders, "[w]e will continue to intensify our actions to achieve the objectives I described in my report to Congress of March 26 and to support the international relief efforts being conducted in the region." President Clinton reiterated the open-ended extent of the United States' commitment, "It is not possible to predict how long either of these operations will continue. The duration of the deployments depend upon the course of events in Kosovo, and in particular, on Belgrade's conduct with respect to its campaign of ethnic cleansing and the duration of the threat posed to peace and security in the region."
     Similarly, Secretary of State Madeline Albright has stated that "As the President and our military leaders have made clear, this struggle may be long."
     On April 12, President Clinton designated the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (including Serbia and Montenegro), Albania, the Adriatic Sea and the Ionian Sea north of the 39th parallel, as areas in which Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in combat. The designation was retroactive to March 24, 1999.
     Throughout April and into early May, the NATO air operations continued to grow in intensity and impact. The U.S. and NATO forces have inflicted substantial casualties to Yugoslav military forces, have "severely damaged Yugoslavia's military and industrial capacity," and have inflicted significant casualties and hardships on Yugoslavia's civilian population. U.S. officials have referred to our air attacks as inflicting "heavy damage" and a "heavy price" on Serbian forces in Kosovo and as "decimating the forces on the ground." United States forces have bombed bridges, power lines, industrial facilities, oil refineries and other targets throughout Yugoslavia. United States forces have destroyed a substantial part of Yugoslavia's military equipment and capacity.
     Finally, United States officials have stated that the air offensive against Yugoslavia will escalate in the coming weeks. U.S. General Wesley Clark, the NATO Commander, stated on April 27, 1999, that the air strikes thus far have "been only a fraction of what is to come." Indeed, since the end of April the United States and its NATO allies have significantly expanded its air operations. Defense Department officials assert that "the destruction will accelerate."
     As of today, the Congress has considered several pieces of legislation. The Senate passed a resolution authorizing the President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 23, 1999, but the the House also defeated a measure declaring a state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and a measure directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 20, Senator John McCain and others introduced a joint resolution authorizing the President to use all necessary force in concert with United States allies to accomplish United States and NATO objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
     Neither house of Congress has acted on that resolution. Despite the House of Representatives' decision to reject authorization of the war, the President continues to wage war against Yugoslavia.
     Our Constitution provides that a decision to initiate war be made by Congress. The framers were opposed to giving one person the power to initiate war. As Alexander Hamilton explained, certain interests were "so delicate and momentous" that entrusting them "to the sole disposal" of the President is unwise. The Federalist No. 75, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (discussing treaty power). As a Congressman, Abraham Lincoln argued that the Constitution's intent was "that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression (war) upon us." Qouted in a letter from Lincoln to W.H. Herndon, Feb. 15, 1848. [See A. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 43 (1973).]
     The framers were concerned with ensuring that the judgment to initiate war would not be lightly made. James Madison spoke of war as "among the greatest of national calamities," while Thomas Jefferson desired an "effectual check to the Dog of War," and George Mason was "for clogging, rather than facilitating war." [See The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 397.(J. Boyd ed. 1951)].
      "This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: and this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war." [See The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787 528 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836).]
     The Constitution therefore explicitly vests the power to declare war in Congress. Originally the clause provided that Congress "make" war, but it was changed to "declare" in order to give the President "the power to repel sudden attacks," and to clarify that it was the Executive's function to "conduct" the war once Congress authorized it.
     This unambiguous constitutional mandate was to ensure that the United States would not engage in warfare without a clear mandate from the legislature. The President's power as Commander-in-Chief does not allow him to violate the explicit Article I mandate that Congress initiate war. The Commander-in-Chief power permits the President to conduct a war once it has been declared by Congress, not to initiate one himself. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers: "The President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.
     Courts have been virtually unanimous in finding that a decision to wage a war requires prior congressional approval, except to respond to an enemy attack.
     Modern judicial interpretations of the War Powers Clause have reached the same conclusion. Every Vietnam War era case that reached the merits of the issue concluded that the Constitution required congressional authorization of that war. This Circuit held that the Constitution requires that Congress affirmatively authorize war, except where the President acts to repel an enemy attack or to respond to a grave emergency where the nation might be defeated or crippled before Congress could act.
     The overwhelming weight of scholarly authority also supports the view that the President cannot initiate war without congressional approval except to repel an attack.
     Mr. Clinton's involvement of the United States in military hostilities between the United States and Yugoslavia meets any conceivable test of the applicability of the War Powers Clause. Thousands of United States Armed Forces are currently engaged in the longest armed conflict the United States government has undertaken since the end of the Vietnam War. There can be no question that the United States is involved in a war against a sovereign state.
     A broad cross-section of prominent constitutional law scholars agree that the Constitution requires congressional authorization for all non-defensive, non-emergency deployment of U.S. forces in combat against another country. A letter dated October 14, 1994 from Professors Bruce Ackerman (Yale), Abram Chayes (Harvard), Lori Damrosch (Columbia), John Hart Ely (Stanford and Miami visiting), Gerald Gunther (Stanford), Louis Henkin (Columbia), Harold Hongju Koh (Yale), Philip B. Kurland (Chicago), Laurence H. Tribe (Harvard), and William Van Alystyne (Duke) supports the legal opinion that the U.S. Constitution "reserves to Congress alone the prerogative and duty to authorize initiation of hostilities.
     In the meantime, however, proponents of Executive power argue that the President can initiate minor uses of force without obtaining congressional approval. But substantial agreement exists even among most proponents of strong executive power that the commitment of significant numbers of American armed forces to sustained combat against a foreign government requires congressional approval.
     The Clinton administration has previously recognized that a commitment of significant United States Armed Forces to sustained combat in which they inflict substantial casualties would constitute war for constitutional purposes. The Administration's response to a request from four U.S. Senators concerning the lawfulness of the planned U.S. invasion of Haiti claimed that the planned deployment did not constitute "war" because it was undertaken "with the full consent of the legitimate [Haitian] government," "was unlikely to involve major or prolonged hostilities," that U.S. forces were unlikely to "suffer or inflict substantial casualties, and would not "involve extreme use of force, as for example preparatory bombardment." Letter of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, September 27, 1994. The Administration thus implicitly recognized that where substantial U.S. forces attacked another country without the consent of the recognized government, leading to prolonged hostilities, inflicting substantial casualties on the enemy, and involving such "extreme" uses of force as sustained air "bombardment," the United States was engaged in "war" for constitutional purposes.
     The War Powers Resolution reflects Congress' similar view that, irrespective of whether the Executive can unilaterally initiate minor uses of force, sustained hostilities lasting 60 days clearly constitute war and constitutionally require congressional approval. The war powers time clock thus represents Congress' understanding that sustained, continuous, significant hostilities constitute war for constitutional purposes.
     The present armed conflict clearly represents a U.S. deployment of substantial force against another country in sustained and continuous combat. As of May 14, 1999, United States and other NATO allied aircraft have flown over 20,000 sorties over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and have dropped over 9,000 bombs and missiles on over 1,900 Yugoslav targets. The United States has committed approximately 800 warplanes to action on a daily basis over Yugoslavia, deploying tens of thousands of military personnel. To support the U.S. air offensive, President Clinton has authorized the Pentagon to summon as many as 33,102 reservists to active duty. That decision represents the largest activation of reservists since the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq. General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that the military's operation over Kosovo is a major theater of war.
     This large scale offensive against Yugoslavia is of indefinite duration. As of May 25, 1999, NATO's military offensive will have already lasted 60 days. In testimony before Congress on April 21, 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that "As the President and our military leaders have made clear, this struggle [with Yugoslavia] may be long." General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that it is possible for Milosevic's force (composed of over 40,000 troops) to "hold out for quite some time."
     The U.S. and NATO forces have inflicted substantial casualties to Yugoslav military forces, have "severely damaged Yugoslavia's military and industrial capacity," and have inflicted significant casualties and hardships on Yugoslavia's civilian population. United States officials have referred to our air attacks as inflicting "heavy damage" to and a "heavy price" on Serbian forces in Kosovo and as "decimating the forces on the ground. United States forces have bombed bridges, power lines, industrial facilities, oil refineries and other targets throughout Yugoslavia.
     Finally, United States officials have stated that the air offensive against Yugoslavia will escalate in the coming weeks. U.S. General Wesley Clark, the NATO Commander, stated on April 27, 1999, that the air strikes thus far have "been only a fraction of what is to come." Indeed, since the end of April the United States and its NATO allies have significantly expanded air operations. The United States is committed to deploying close to 1,000 aircraft out of a total NATO force of 1,259 and Defense Department officials assert that "the destruction will accelerate."
     The war against Yugoslavia cannot be ought of as rescue operations undertaken by Presidents in the 19th century, nor the more modern examples of Executive unilateral deployment of United States Armed Forces into combat. For example, the 1983 Grenada invasion, or the 1986 air strike against Libya, the 1990 Panama invasion, the 1995 Bosnia air strikes, the 1992 deployment of peacekeeping troops to Somalia, the December 1998 air strikes against Iraq, or the August 1998 missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan. None of these post-Vietnam examples involved the initiation of substantial, sustained combat against a foreign state, and none involved armed force of the magnitude and duration of the United States and allied attack against Yugoslavia.
     Mr. Clinton's action is quite separate and presents a constitutionally crisis. White House officials have attempted to avoid referring to Mr. Clinton's military adventure against Yugoslavia as a war. However, the public, news media and front line soldiers recognize the current conflict for what it is war in the real sense of the word. The constitutional command that Congress authorize war cannot be negated by presidential tounge-twisitng and nose-pulling.
     Professor John Basset Moore, one of the most prominent international law professors of the first half of the 20th century expressed it well when he wrote, "There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of the Constitution, when they vested in Congress the power to declare war, never imagined that they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval forces of the United States all over the world for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his notions of the fitness of things, so long as he refrained from calling his action war or persisted in calling it peace."
     The Constitution requires the affirmative assent of Congress to initiate or continue warfare. Congress has not explicitly authorized the current war against Yugoslavia. In fact, the House of Representatives has explicitly decided not to authorize the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 28, 1999, the House defeated by a vote of 213 to 213 S. Con. Res. 21 which would have authorized such military operations. That explicit refusal to authorize the current operations is dicisive and is a clear congressional decision on the precise issue before the Court.
      When every 8th Grade student had to pass a test on the U.S. Constitution to advance to the 9th Grade, students knew that in voting to appropriate money, a Congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and continuation might vote for the military appropriation and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting.
     If the President does not terminate the use of United States Armed Forces by May 25, 1999, he will be acting in blatant violation of the WPR. The resolution's requirements are straightforward. The President is required to submit a report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate within 48 hours of when United States Armed Forces are introduced "into hostilities." The President submitted the required report on March 26, within 48 hours of the first air strikes on Yugoslavia. The WPR then requires that within 60 calendar days "after such a report is submitted or required to be submitted," the President must "terminate" all such use of United States Armed Forces unless Congress has declared war, enacted specific authorization, or extended the sixty-day period. Congress has refused to take any of these actions. May 25, 1996 markes the critical 60th day after March 26,1999. Mr. Clinton was in clear violation of the WPR.
     The WPR, passed in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, embodies Congress' search for a legal mechanism to enforce the congressional war-making power. It was passed to prevent war by presidential fiat and to protect the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. The WPR requires that the President "shall submit" a report to Congress within 48 hours (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.
      This report begins the sixty-day period within which troops must be withdrawn in the absence of Congressional approval. The statute contains special priority procedures to guarantee that any legislation approving a commitment of U.S. Armed Forces or mandating their withdrawal during that sixty-day period is acted on quickly. The Congress did, in fact, consider such resolutions and rejected any authorization for those forces or a declaration of war.
      On March 26, 1999, Mr. Clinton submitted the report required under the WPR to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The report tracks the statutory requirements of the WPR and was treated by the House and Senate as the report is required. The President states that he has the authority acting on his own to initiate hostilities with Yugoslavia. His only reference to Congress is to state that he "has taken into account the views and support expressed by the Congress. Mr. Clinton concludes by stating that he is "providing this report...consistent with the War Powers Resolution...."
      Mr. Clinton is requird to file a report before the sixty-day cut-off period is triggered. Otherwise the statute would be valueless, leaving the power to initiate war in the hands of the President and would do nothing to relieve Congress of the unconstitutional burden of acting affirmatively to stop a presidential war.
      A report was "required to be submitted" by March 26, within forty-eight hours of the beginning of the air war and Mr. Clinton did so. U.S. forces clearly had been "introduced into hostilities." The WPR defines what is meant by "introduction of United States Armed Forces" and the legislative history sets forth the understanding of "hostilities." The House Report states that the President is required to report whenever he takes significant action committing U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities abroad or the risk where there is reasonable expectation that American military personnel will be subject to hostile fire. A subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs changed the language in the House bill by substituting the word "hostilities" for the phrase "armed conflict" because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope. The administration has admitted that U.S. military forces are engaged in "armed conflict" in Yugoslavia.
     Secretary of Defense Cohen in testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee on April 15, 1999, stated: "[W]e're certainly engaged in hostilities. We're engaged in combat. Whether that measures up to a classic definition of war, I'm not qualified to say."

     [Editor's Note: See the comprehensive Legal Guide to Kosovo Conflict..]

(C)Copyright, 1999 The Daily Republican Newspaper. All Rights Reserved.

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Friday, May 21, 1999

Raising children to resist violence
Make sure they are supervised at all times.
By Kaye Grogan, and Andrew Ping

     WASHINGTON - A month to the day, after the Littleton shootings, another student took gun in hand and shot at his peers in Georgia. The news media has covered these senseless violent acts with a straight face. We have done it without the slightest sense of our own mindless contribution. After all, media publicity made the Littleton and the Georgia tragedies a word-wide center of media frenzy. Sensationalist journalism placed these schools at Center Stage. You won't find Congress talking about outlawing the sale and possession of newspapers, radio talk shows and television broadcasts, however.
     Meanwhile, public schools are fast becoming very unsafe for children and other living things. Sadly, respect for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are falling by the wayside. The latest research into the causes of violent or aggressive behavior reveals that it is most often learned early in life. However, parents, family members, and others who care for children can help them learn to deal with emotions without using violence. Parents and others can also take steps to reduce or minimize violence.
     Parents play a valuable role in reducing violence by raising children in safe and loving homes. Give your children consistent love and attention. Every child needs a strong, loving, relationship with a parent or other adult to feel safe and secure and to develop a sense of trust. Behavior problems and delinquency are less likely to develop in children whose parents are involved in their lives, especially at an early age.
     Driven by the latest wave of school violence, mental health specialists are tackling some of the everyday torments of childhood with a growing sense of urgency.
     Some of the latest studies, being released today in the Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, delve into the roots of social phobias and suicidal behavior in childhood and adolescence.
     Counter to what news junkies might think, the latest statistics show that violence is declining overall in U.S. schools. Increasingly, mental-health and social factors set the stage in the youngest children for the most violent and self destructive symptoms which are not recognized by others until many years later.
     In one new study published today, clinical psychologist Deborah Beidel, Ph.D. at the University of Maryland and colleagues found evidence that childhood social phobia -- a debilitating form of extreme, long-lasting shyness -- affects up to 4 percent of youngsters.
     Dr. Beidel studied 50 children between the ages of seven and thirteen who had been referred with problems of social adjustment, inability to make friends and refusal to participate in group activity at school.
     ``We really didn't know just how bad these kids are suffering,'' Dr. Beidel said, noting symptoms of adult-like depression in kids still young enough to believe in the Tooth Fairy.
     A recent study of childhood suicide, conducted by National Institute of Mental Health researchers, traced 98 families for as long as 12 years, showing thoughts of suicide to be fairly common in younger children but almost never actually attempted until puberty.
     About 20 percent of children who expressed suicidal thoughts in their pre-teens went on to make an attempt during adolescence. Results showed a higher risk of suicidal thoughts in children of depressed mothers, but the data also raised the possibility that the highest risk of all was among children ``who had been scorned by their fathers.''
      Children depend on their parents and family members for encouragement, protection, and support as they learn to think for themselves. Without proper supervision, children do not receive the guidance they need. Studies report that unsupervised children often have behavior problems.
      Insist on knowing where your children are at all times and who their friends are. When you are unable to watch your children, ask someone you trust to watch them for you. Never leave young children home alone. Encourage your school-aged and older children to participate in supervised after-school activities such as sports teams, tutoring programs, or organized recreation. Enroll them in local community programs, especially those run by adults whose values you respect.
     Accompany your children to supervised play activities and watch how they get along with others. Teach your children how to respond appropriately when others use insults or threats or deal with anger by hitting.
     Explain to your children that these are not appropriate behaviors, and encourage them to avoid other children who behave that way.
     Show your children appropriate behaviors by the way you act.
      Children often learn by example. The behavior, values, and attitudes of parents and siblings have a strong influence on children. Values of respect, honesty, and pride in your family and heritage can be important sources of strength for children, especially if they are confronted with negative peer pressure, live in a violent neighborhood, or attend a rough school.
     Do not punish your child for showing aggressive reactions. Most children sometimes act aggressively and may hit another person. Be firm with your children about the possible dangers of violent behavior. Remember also to praise your children when they solve problems constructively without violence. Children are more likely to repeat good behaviors when they are rewarded with attention and praise.
     Parents sometimes encourage aggressive behavior without knowing it. For example, some parents think it is good for a boy to learn to fight. Teach your children that it is better to settle arguments with calm words, not fists, threats, or weapons. And most importantly, don't hit your children. Be consistent about rules and discipline.
     Try to keep your children from seeing too much violence in the media. A recent report has confirmed that consistently watching violence in movies, on television, and in video games can have a negative effect on children's attitudes toward violence. As a parent, you can control the amount of violence your children see in the media.
     The American Psychological Association recommends that parents limit television viewing time to 1 to 2 hours a day. Make sure you know what TV shows your children watch, which movies they see, and what kinds of video games they play. Talk to your children about the violence that they see on TV shows, in the movies, and in video games. Help them understand how painful it would be in real life and the serious consequences for violent behaviors.Discuss with them ways to solve problems without violence.
     Help your children stand up against violence. Support your children in learning how to resist violence. Teach them to respond with calm but firm words when others insult, threaten, or hit another person. Help them understand that it takes more courage and leadership to resist violence than to go along with it. Teach them to respond with calm but firm words when others insult, threaten, or hit another person. Help them understand that it takes more courage and leadership to resist violence than to go along with it.
     Help your children accept and get along with others from various racial and ethnic backgrounds. Teach them that criticizing people because they are different is hurtful, and that name-calling, bullying and threats are unacceptable behaviors. Make sure they understand that using words to start or encourage violence, or to quietly accept violent behavior is harmful.

     [Editor's Note: Howard Hobbs also contributed to this story. The American Psychological Association offers to provide readers with printed materials on teaching children to resist violence. Contact the American Academy, Division of Publications, 141 Northwest Point Blvd, PO Box 927, Elk Grove Village, IL 60009-0927.]

(C)Copyright, 1999 The Daily Republican Newspaper. All Rights Reserved.

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Thursday, May 20, 1999

Sick heart of modern Europe
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation
By Samantha Power

     BOSTON - Returning to the United States after covering Bosnia for two years, I am struck by the American public's refusal to see the conflict as a shameful war of aggression and its eagerness to embrace claims that it was nothing more than an intractable, insoluble, and inevitable "civil war." The conflict generated the most grotesque crimes and the largest population shifts in Europe in more than fifty years; it shattered post-Cold War hopes for international order and transatlantic unity; and it forced the largest deployment of U.S. peacekeepers in history. Yet the general view-at least the one relayed to me by friends, taxi drivers, and academics-is, "There are no good guys over there; they've been going at it for 2,000 years." Wrong, thankfully, on both counts.interview on BBC television.
     The prevailing haze in this country may owe something to journalists who became so entranced by the four-year siege of indefatigable Sarajevo that they lost touch with an audience whose eyes had long ago glazed over. It may also be the product of the processing powers of an American public notorious for its ephemeral attention span, preoccupied with its homespun economic troubles, and relieved to be told-disingenuously by men who knew better in Washington-that this was a "historic problem from hell." By affixing the label of genocide to the conflict, or even merely by identifying culprits, we implicate ourselves for our sins of omission. Above all, though, as Laura Silber and Alan Little illustrate masterfully in Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, it seems the half-truths that have trickled down deep into the American consciousness are merely tragic, predictable outgrowths of a conflict in which truth was not merely the first casualty but in which lies and manipulation were the war's causus belli.interview on BBC television.
     The Bosnian war was neither simple to follow nor easy to explain; it degenerated into a multipronged struggle for primacy in a neighborhood said to have "so much history it doesn't need a future." At one point the territory that once encapsulated Yugoslavia consisted of one rump country (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprised of Serbia and Montenegro), three newly-recognized states (Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia), one clumsily-named and semi-recognized Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (melodiously shortened to FYROM), four self-proclaimed statelets ( run by rebel Bosnian Serbs, Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and secessionist Muslims) and a handful of wishful autonomists (Serbian Hungarians, Serbian Albanians, Macedonian Albanians, and Croatian Istrians, to name a few). By virtue of the conflict's duration-the Serb siege of Sarajevo outlasted Stalingrad, the U.N. humanitarian airlift outdid Berlin-and the monstrosity of the crimes committed in the name of ethnic purity, it was easy and perhaps comforting for outsiders to dismiss the war as an inevitable ethnic or religious blood-feud.interview on BBC television.
     But as to Yugoslavia's break-up, there was nothing inevitable about the Yugoslav tragedy and nothing preordained about the killing. The war was not the product of religious or even ethnic hatreds run amok; it was the handiwork of criminally negligent and unabashedly power-hungry men with unfortunate supplies of both power and guns. Political opportunists and money-hungry profiteers instigated and perpetrated this tragedy, the authors show, deftly propagating myths and exploiting local fears at the time of Eastern Europe's economic erosion and political collapse in order to put to lie a tradition of peaceful coexistence and to enshrine themselves in the history books and atop their hollow empires.interview on BBC television.
     Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation is not for the casual Yugoslav reader. Piggy-backing the efforts of BBC documentary filmmaker Brian Lapping, Silber and Little sifted through hundreds of the on-camera interviews to capture-in print for the first time-everyone from the inaccessible Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to each of the successive pawns he trampled. Unlike other factual, political narratives, this book is also flavored with colorful ground knowledge that could only come from the Financial Times's Silber and the BBC's Little-journalists who lived and breathed the war from its inception. As a tale about politicians, the book is not as accessible to general readers as Brian Hall's Impossible Country or Mark Thompson's Paper House (both travel writers' journeys through the last days of Yugoslavia). Nor is it as personal or anecdotal as the offerings of other journalists, such as Misha Glenny's Third Balkan War, Ed Vulliamy's A Season in Hell, or Peter Maass's new release, Love Thy Neighbor. In a conflict that the authors rightfully describe as a "war of mirrors," however, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation manages to double as a dense encyclopedia of the tragedy and a dramatic page-turner. It is the first to dissect and relay the details of Yugoslavia's demise and to document the sins of those behind it.interview on BBC television.
     In order to demonstrate the extent to which Yugoslavia's meltdown was calculated and preventable, the authors devote nearly half the book to the build-up to war-tracing the rise of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, the incubation of nationalism, and the carefully staged armed skirmishes that precipitated the crisis. Three themes predominate throughout-the war's top-down character, cold-blooded betrayal, and Western mismanagement.
     First, the authors set out to prove that contrary to popular myth, the Yugoslav conflict was a top-down war. They argue that Yugoslavia did not die a natural death. "Rather," they write, "it was deliberately and systematically killed off by men who had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a peaceful transition from state socialism and one-party rule to free-market democracy." They show how the communist country best positioned to make the leap westward ended up the only one in flames, placing the blame-unequivocally-on the shoulders of those in charge.
     They focus mainly on the two regional strong men, Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. Tudjman, an anti-fascist World War II general who now downplays Holocaust figures, believed it was his "august destiny" to earn a place in history as the father of the modern Croatian state reserved principally-or, if he could swing it, exclusively-for members of the Croatian narod, or nation. Tudjman offered no encouragement to local Serbs (11 percent of the populace) to remain in his state, which seceded from Yugoslavia in June 1991. He downgraded their official status from the cherished "constituent nation" to that of mere "minority." And at times he appeared to whitewash one of the most brutal chapters in Balkan history-the reign of the fascist Croatian independent state from 1941 to 1945, a regime so vicious that German SS guards appealed in cables to their superiors for transfers back to Germany and away from the Croatians who had set out to solve their "Serb question" by converting one-third to Catholicism, expelling one-third, and killing one-third. As Yugoslavia hung on for dear life in 1990, Tudjman told a captive audience of émigrés that the independent Croatian state "was not the creation of fascist criminals; it also stood for the historic aspirations of the Croatian people for an independent state. They knew that Hitler planned to build a new European order." Later he would say he thanked God his wife was "not a Jew or a Serb."
     At times the Balkan breakdown seemed like a choreographed pantomime. If Tudjman were to play the role of a Balkan Mussolini, Serbian president Milosevic would be cast as a Balkan Machiavelli. Silber and Little have reserved a special place in their narrative for Milosevic, the root of all that is tragic and most that is evil. The authors accomplish this not by hectoring or moralizing. Rather, they let the events and recollections of the key players speak for themselves. Through detailed interviews with Milosevic and his closest associates, the authors present evidence of his beguiling artifice, ruthless opportunism and-not surprising from the man who delighted Dayton peace negotiators by playing "Tenderly" on the piano at Wright Air Force Base-his charm. Readers are able to watch him operate for nearly a decade; they see him trade in his communist party badge for nationalist credentials, stage theatric resignations and confrontations, labor over "impromptu" speeches before the "spontaneous" masses (paid by him to appear), and succeed in turning neighbor against neighbor for his own advance.interview on BBC television.
     Though credited with masterminding the war and implicated in this account for dispatching Serb paramilitaries to Bosnia's most notorious killing fields, the wily Milosevic claims repeatedly to be out of the loop-a loop he created. In March 1991, as Croatia and Slovenia were marching toward independence but before fighting erupted, Serbian students staged a protest in Belgrade. On Milosevic's orders Yugoslav tanks arrived to crush the rally. In a meeting with Milosevic, the 26-year-old student leader Zarko Jokanovic grew so exasperated with Milosevic's denials of responsibility that he asked, "Are you currently responsible for anything in this country? You are behaving like the Queen of England when you have the power of a Russian tsar." Unfortunately for Serbia and the rest of the disintegrating country, Jokanovic would be one of Milosevic's last challengers. When full-fledged fighting erupted two months later and the Serbian president used his iron grip on the mass media to cultivate hysteric fears that the Serb nation was under attack, dissenters were portrayed and viewed as traitors to hallowed "Serbdom." Four years after the protests had fizzled, Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic personally oversaw the massacre of up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys near the fallen "safe area" of Srebrenica in July 1995. Milosevic, who maintained constant contact with Mladic and whose government paid his salary, earnestly denied any knowledge of the slaughter. He told the U.S. chief diplomat in Belgrade, "Why blame me? I have been unable to contact Mladic."
     The slogan that Milosevic used in his early purges was "the people have happened," a cruel irony. For the most part, the people in Yugoslavia "happened" only in so far as the nightly news told them to happen. In this sense Milosevic stepped in right where Tito-a ruler likened to a giant oak tree under whose shadow nothing could grow-left off. While Tito played up Yugoslav "brotherhood and unity" at the expense of truth and freedom, Milosevic played up ethnic separatism at the expense of truth and peace. The assortment of South Slavs assembled in Yugoslavia-especially the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats who share what used to be called the "Serbo-Croat" language-had far more in common than not. Tito had done a great disservice to his legacy by stifling dissent and not permitting the voicing of grievances. This ensured that national sentiments were not allowed to "grow and expire"; instead, they festered. The authors describe an atavism in Serb nationalism as it emerg